[[{“value”:”

By: Jackie Wilson

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the official position of Working Mass.

Electoralism is a strategy of electing politicians with the goal of creating political change. From a young age, many of us are indoctrinated to believe voting has great power;our childhoods are filled with lessons and stories about how voting is the way democracy is preserved and political change happens, backed by a sanitized lie that the Civil Rights Movement achieved its ends through the vote and not human struggle itself.  Elections have very rarely achieved any meaningful changes for the working class or done any lasting damage to the capitalist system. As Lenin argued in The State and Revolution, “to decide once every few years which member of the ruling class is to misrepresent the people in parliament is the real essence of bourgeois parliamentarism.” Politicians will always be more loyal to preserving the system that safeguards capital rather than liberating the masses, precisely because of their relation to the electoral system of the state, even with professed socialist politics. 

We have pursued a heavily electoral strategy in recent years of the Massachusetts socialist movement. Even recent debates have centered on methods of electoralism, rather than the question of its strategic value. There may be times where engaging in electoralism is strategic, even Lenin in Left-Wing Communism agrees that action by the masses, a big strike, for instance, is more important than parliamentary activity at all times. In order to combat the inevitable results of electoralism’s demobilization of mass movements, as well as its ineffectiveness in developing organizers, we need a break from electoral strategy itself in 2026.

Electoralism as a Way to Demobilize Mass Movements

Electoralism can’t have real revolutionary power if it is so encouraged and permitted by the state; this holds true in Massachusetts today, as in any other epoch where the state has used electoralism as a valve for discontent to be exhausted. As socialists, we strive to agitate workers and tenants to lose their own fear and come together in mass movements. When mass movements erupt into disruptions of the current system, politicians lockstep to stop those movements. That’s shown again and again, even in the annals of sports labor, as during the 2020 uprising. When NBA players began mobilizing to strike in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement, Barack Obama called Lebron James and National Basketball Players’ Association (NBPA)  President Chris Paul, urging them to cancel the strike in favor of pushing voter turnout:  “in one fell swoop, electoralism had shut down mass mobilization.”

Instead of instilling what Asad Haider called a “class hatred” characterized by a “consistent antagonism to the system,” elections serve as a way to make the masses feel as though they have power over the current system.Obama’s response to the NBA strike how politicians can use elections to redirect the energy of a mass movement from escalating towards revolutionary class struggle to largely meaningless civic performance, but liberal politicians are not the only figures guilty. The Communist Party, USA largely sacrificed its Black-led base-building and organizing infrastructure in Alabama for a Popular Front motioned from above, with no input from members. As Fanon wrote in Wretched of the Earth,  “the leader pacifies the people.” Elections allow people to voice their anger about the oppressive system, but they do not bring together the working class in a way that can sustain active, militant mass movements.

The question of the ballot line distracts from the reality that dedicating resources to the strategy itself means losing ground. The Democratic and Republican Parties drone strike civilians overseas, expand the militarization of the police, deport immigrants, and engage in union-busting practices, co-opting left-wing dissent, while smaller third-party candidates either have no chance of winning an election or have no real means to enact the changes they promised once elected. 

Rosa Luxemburg remains correct.  We can talk about Socialists in Office all day, but to Luxemburg, a socialist in office can either work in opposition to the bourgeois government, which means they would not be an active member of the government and be removed from office, or they can carry out the duties necessary for the government to remain operational, which means they would not be a socialist. 

The Ineffectiveness of Electoral Politics in Developing Organizers 

Beyond the ineffectiveness of electoralism to achieve any meaningful change in and of itself, elections don’t raise class consciousness or increase revolutionary skill. Voting is not a form of class struggle, so participation in voting does not either. As McNally and Post argued: ”Not only do the people you ‘organize’ electorally remain isolated and passive, rather than active participants in their own liberation, but election campaigns that focus on winning must appeal to voters’ existing consciousness.” 

Other strategies do not rely on activating existing consciousness, mobilizing over organizing, but rather on actual change from within. Elections de-emphasize the ability of people to liberate themselves by positing an outside savior as the key actor in political struggle. 

Part of this urge to seek an outside savior comes from fear. In his work on death denial and the phenomenon of transference, Ernest Becker argues that individuals who have intense fear or denial of death will often seek out some kind of savior. In the case of revolutionary struggle, those who are afraid of their own or the revolution’s death will seek some figure that provides a sense of immortality. This is a means to avoid the weight of our responsibility as individuals to the revolutionary project, which includes the collective and one another, to the masses themselves as the ones actually capable of leading us to liberation. It’s much easier to think we can find the perfect champion whom we cheer on like any other celebrity. A core tenet of socialism is the belief in the liberatory power of the working class, not individual celebrities or champions. We should not let our fears override that belief. 

Fear may be an unconscious undercurrent, but socialists offer many arguments for why electoral strategies advance the socialist struggle. When organizers prioritize electoral campaigns, they often justify the strategic move with the claim that elections bring visibility to the organization and new members into the movement. When we conflate electing a champion with bringing new members into an organization, socialist organizations take a more evangelical posturing – telling others the “good news” of the politician bringing socialism to the people at the low price of one vote – towards the working class than one that seeks to unlock workers’ and tenants’ own power to shape historical forces. People must rely on the second coming of their god for salvation. We know that there is no second coming of anything that will save us. There’s no reason for us to focus exclusively on “raising awareness” or “spreading the good news of communism” when we can engage directly as political actors in class struggles and mass movements themselves.

Rather than build an international workers’ movement, electoralist strategies at the expense of others often lead to socialists supporting reactionary leaders and forging cross-class alliances that diminish important principles. The Communist Party, USA’s abandonment of base-building in Alabama for the Popular Front is one example; During the 1960s, the Iraqi Communist Party sacrificed any principle “in order to forge a relationship with those in power.”  After the 1958 revolution, the communists in Iraq united with Kassem, the military leader, and with the national bourgeoisie. This proved disastrous for the Iraqi Communist Party when the Ba’athist government turned against the communists resulting in much of the party’s central committee members exiled, imprisoned or executed.

The Iraqi Communist Party’s great weakness lay in its politics rather than its organization. Rather than forge ahead and offer independent leadership to the workers’ movement, the party retreated and refused to challenge the Free Officers’ leader Abd’al-Karim Qassem for power. By aligning with the government and the bourgeoisie, the party saw the tragic destruction of their movement which allowed for the rise of the Ba’athist Party. In the best of circumstances, bourgeois politicians and leaders will pacify and demobilize mass movements, and in the worst of circumstances, bourgeois politicians and leaders will violently repress and purge those mass movements.

DSA’s Electoral Priorities

The role of socialists in bourgeois society is to form an opposition party. Without insurgent mobilizations that advance working class power to produce political disruptions, which undergird the opposition to the system, engaging in electoralism within the capitalist state will result in a weakening of the socialist left.  As a socialist organization, DSA should prioritize actions that have the potential to undermine social divisions among working people and build antiracist and feminist class solidarity. Actions that involve confrontational action have the most power to radically transform working class people to build unity across social differences. 

Rather than prioritize electoral campaigns, DSA chapters should imagine ways for the working class to engage in their own liberation: union organizing for both tenants and workers, mutual aid network-building in our neighborhood groups, and anti-ICE response.  

Boston DSA joined the Homes For All coalition for a campaign to get rent control on the ballot in 2026, since rent control would be a massive victory for renters across the state, unlocking room for successive victories. There are even more direct examples of such power from below: Mattapan tenants won rent control for 347 buildings after an aggressive 6-year long fight. Without waiting for legislative solutions, these tenants succeeded in making their homes permanently affordable. We could do that for other neighborhoods and in other buildings. We don’t have to beg the Massachusetts legislation to protect us from price-gouging landlords. We can take matters into our own hands and win. 

By forming mutual aid networks, people do not need to beg for assistance from an uncaring government. When the government shutdown ended SNAP victims, neighborhoods across Boston sprang into action. Residents expanded food pantries, created meal trains, and coordinated food deliveries. Even after SNAP benefits have been reinstated, those networks remain. The foundation and structure created to respond to crises can be supported by neighborhood groups, the anchoring and most local formation of the DSA chapter. In neighborhood groups and other spaces, we can mobilize residents, distribute food and necessary supplies to support people facing food insecurity. Mutual aid groups like Food Not Bombs or Warm Up Boston have long been supporting our unhoused neighbors; participation and initiative like theirs can be pioneered in order to build the infrastructure of organization needed for mass disruption.  As we escalate and build towards mass disruptions, we need to have infrastructure to support workers and tenants on the front lines of militant union action like striking. Strong mutual aid networks allow workers to stay on strike for as long as it takes for corporations to come to the bargaining table and meet their demands. 

We can take back our streets and our cities from ICE and police forces. Rather than appeal to politicians who will offer little more than empty platitudes since they work for and maintain this system that abducts our neighbors, we can form ICE watch hubs, supporting and expanding the LUCE networks, while developing patrol systems as organizers have in Los Angeles and Metro DC in response to federal occupation.  Chicago, New York City, and Raleigh have all had success in chasing ICE out of their cities. This is only possible by training members in de-arresting techniques and direct action skills. Organizers in Minnesota rally outside of hotels where ICE agents are hosted, which not only demoralizes the ICE agents, but also disrupts the hotel business. These are the type of actions that hurt capitalists the most, which our chapter and others should prioritize.

 As the Greek poet Archilochus said, we don’t rise to the level of our expectations; we fall to the level of our training.

If we are rallying behind someone we believe may look favorably on our demands rather than fighting for those demands ourselves, we are not training ourselves for revolution. Any reforms that the government offers, the workers can win through unions and militant campaigns. When the workers win reforms through revolutionary class struggle, they have the training necessary to be part of a mass movement that can fight for and win a socialist future. The purpose of a socialist organization should be to build a mass movement of revolutionaries who have been radicalized through class struggle. A revolution requires revolutionaries.

Jackie Wilson is a Boston DSA member and a contributing writer to Working Mass.

The post OPINION: A Revolution Requires Revolutionaries, Not Candidates  appeared first on Working Mass.

“}]] 

[[{“value”:”

By: Dalton Galloway

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the official position of Working Mass.

Reflecting back on the 2025 election season, Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) has major accomplishments for which to be proud.

In a year without federal elections, DSA nonetheless captured lightning in a bottle and secured Zohran Mamdani the Democratic nomination and ultimately the mayoralty in New York City. Locally, meanwhile, Boston DSA nominated four candidates, supporting Willie Burnley, Jr. for Mayor of Somerville, Marcos Candido for Lowell City Council, and Ayah al-Zubi (first) and Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler (second) for Cambridge City Council.

Both Cambridge City Council candidates were victorious; Candido lost an extremely close race by fewer than forty votes with 49% of the vote;  Burnley captured around 45% of the vote. In New York City, Mamdani swept to victory with more votes than any mayoral candidate in decades, a victory already swelling DSA’s ranks by the thousands. Membership has already surpassed 90,000 in good standing — the highest-ever.

All four candidates endorsed by Boston DSA are DSA members – as is Mamdani. This is something that, in 2025, practically goes without saying. However, it was not always the case that DSA endorsees were consistently members of the organization or that a non-socialist candidate was essentially an endorsement non-starter. 

What Does It Mean To Be a Socialist Candidate in 2026?

We have learned from experience that endorsement of candidates who do not organize within our fold leads to a situation where DSA is easily cast aside once elected, placing DSA in the unenviable position of no ability to influence decisions made by candidates whose political failures we are nonetheless tied to upon endorsement. 

The consensus view that DSA candidates ought to be avowed socialists (and nearly always members) emerged out of bitter disappointments felt by comrades across DSA’s internal political spectrum, but also from years of internal deliberations and debate.

Now, it is my hope that a similar inflection point is at hand on how DSA ought to select its candidates and how we should relate to candidates – and officials, upon their election. While some of the results of the 2025 DSA Convention suggest the partyist wing of DSA holds a bare majority, the organization is clearly not yet to the point of consensus around how we collectively address and support our candidates.

Instead, we must contend that disputes around our relationship to elected officials remain some of DSA’s most hotly contested debates.

All factions of DSA proclaim the need to “build power,” none more than would-be DSA office-holders. However, there are dueling perceptions of what this phrase means. For some, it means increasing the number of elected officials who are sympathetic to democratic socialist ideals: candidates who may or may not be DSA members, may or may not receive our endorsement, but who will work with DSA on certain priorities. Certainly, this approach would result in more boxes we could tick when tallying up the numbers of DSA endorsees in office. 

However, this vision-of elected officials as allies of DSA and the socialist movement rather than as representatives thereof must be cast aside if DSA is serious about its aspirations to function as a political party. Raising the bar for endorsement to being a member of DSA is insufficient when the organization and wider movement need a broader paradigm shift;  paying a few dozen dollars a year to the organization is important, but far more important is a willingness to represent our platform and organization while in office.

What Are We Building in 2026?

For the partyist wing of DSA to make the case that we collectively should make decisions and priorities based on a vision of elected officials as representatives of our organization, the first priority is illustrating the importance of the organization: the party. That means defining what exactly a party is. The United States does not have political parties in the classical sense of the term- rather, it has ballot lines, and undemocratic organizations which are vaguely affiliated with those ballot lines but in most cases do not directly determine who runs on them. The Democratic “Party” is at the center of a much larger financing, influence, turnout, and policy network that exerts real control over politicians. But it is voter registration or even self-identification that makes the average “Democrat,” not participation or identification with the labyrinthine workings of the organization itself.

When we speak of a party, we mean a democratic mass-membership organization which has its own independent political program. Indeed, these principles were codified as the basis of DSA’s structure at the 2025 National Convention with the passage of a resolution entitled “Principles for Party Building.” 

Our ability to implement our goals and to agitate workers toward the socialist party is compromised when we lend our full support to candidates who have not committed to a socialist program, and who see DSA not as their party but as merely one member of a coalition which supports them – a coalition which includes liberal and bourgeois-progressive forces. That is not to say that DSA members running for office should not seek out any external sources of support – it’s difficult for any of our candidates to win if they aren’t at least winning over Warren Democrats – but if DSA is seen not a party to be built, but an interest group to be placated, there is little incentive in building the organization or in agitating for its long-term program. 

Building power must not just mean electing DSA endorsees, or even DSA members, to elected office. Building power means electing candidates who will legislate according to the platform of, be accountable to, and ultimately be elected on behalf of DSA.

DSA enters 2026 with the most members we have ever had, fresh off our highest-profile victory ever. Whether or not one believes electoralism ought to be the primary focus of DSA, there can be little doubt engagement in elections has been the primary driver of membership growth. DSA should run focused campaigns at the federal, state, and municipal level. These candidates must be willing to put forward an oppositional, independent, and socialist political vision on the campaign trail and, should they win, from the halls of power, adhering to the DSA platform at all stages. 

Otherwise, while we may help to build a progressive mandate, we cannot help but fail to build the Party.

Dalton Galloway is a member of Boston DSA and contributing writer to Working Mass.

The post OPINION: Oppositional, Independent, and Socialist Candidates appeared first on Working Mass.

“}]] 

[[{“value”:”

By: Ric Blair

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not represent the official position of Working Mass.

The 2025 election cycle has left Boston Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) stronger and better positioned for the future; As far as I see it, this is a fact. Members across the region have pounded the pavement to spread the message of our endorsed candidates, leading to victories or strong showings in every race we ran this cycle.

In the process, too, Boston DSA, and all the zip codes it entails, has built up chapter capacity in meaningful ways and set the stage for even greater future success. 

In Somerville

Coming into 2025, Somerville DSA was a growing section of the chapter that had existed in a substantive sense for many years—my first ever interface with the chapter was, after all, the 2021 “Somerville for All” slate. But Somerville DSA itself – the Somerville “neighborhood group,” still felt nascent. Earlier this year, Somerville created its own leadership structure and self-organized out of the neighborhood group model of ad hoc initiatives and towards a branch with organizing campaigns and political decision-making.

One decision that Somerville DSA made as a body following the chapter endorsement of Willie Burnley, Jr. for Mayor was to establish a member-led apparatus to elect Burnley. The campaign was selected as the sole external priority of the branch, aimed at creating new member leaders from the campaign’s many tasks. Membership elected  three campaign stewards to bottomline the campaign and mobilize new members to campaign events. Those stewards, in collaboration with the Electoral Working Group and Burnley’s campaign, created the campaign’s field operation. What began as weekend canvasses only eventually expanded into Willie Wednesdays, then regular phone banks, volunteer recruitment calls, and beyond. 

An essential element of this process was new member leadership. Instead of relying on only activating the same core of members, Somerville intentionally worked to organize new leaders from members recently entering the organization or buried in its paper membership.  The Somerville DSA campaign stewards themselves were a mix of longtime members and former chapter and working group leadership, alongside newer self-motivated members. As Willie’s campaign worked to expand capacity, they brought in experienced electoral organizers with DSA connections and focused on greatly expanding their roster of field leads, recruiting nearly 20 highly motivated and reliable volunteers to bottom line canvassing shifts.

 This diffuse structure of campaigning is exactly what powered Mamdani’s victory, and while Somerville did not see that level of success, It was not because of a weak field operation down the stretch. Rather, the lesson here is the exact same one from last year’s campaign to elect Evan Mackay to the state house: that our campaigns should be operating at the necessary scale by the summer, or rather as early as possible. The expansion of capacity on Evan’s and Willie’s campaigns was substantial but too late to swing the ultimate result. 

Willie, and thus DSA, lost ultimately because the expansion of capacity didn’t happen quickly enough.  But in the process of running this campaign, Somerville DSA spent the better part of a year organizing in the community, developing leaders, growing the local membership, and spreading class consciousness in Somerville through organizing conversations. Somerville DSA’s leadership is now entirely composed of new members, most of whom were brought into organization through campaign tasks, but have now transitioned into organizers in other parts of their lives. Members canvassed relentlessly across the city with volunteer turnout driven by a concerted effort to make recruitment calls, both through chapter-owned lists on “Turnout Tuesdays” and with campaign lists on a regular basis. Many of the members who a year ago had barely interacted with the chapter or not even joined yet became involved with DSA through Willie’s campaign and have become effective local leaders in their own right. 

In Lowell

Marcos Candido’s campaign for Lowell City Council was a vehicle for the rejuvenation of Merrimack Valley DSA. What had been a largely overshadowed section of the chapter pulled itself together in the name of electing Marcos, who cut his teeth organizing a union with his coworkers at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), who campaigned on a relentless door-knocking operation kickstarted weeks before the preliminary after a crucial Boston DSA endorsement.  He  lost by 39 votes. It was another eerie reminder of Evan’s race, in which the incumbent won out by 41 votes. The democratic socialist project was two votes, far slimmer than even a field margin, from the capture of key seats. 

The campaign leaves behind a window of opportunity to solidify and grow a democratic socialist presence in the Merrimack Valley. Comrades were inspired by Marcos’s energy and connection to the labor movement, which has connected more members from electoral to labor work. Further, already, the neighborhood group has organized beyond the campaign; in November 2025, Merrimack Valley DSA co-hosted an organizing training for local tenants with the Emergency Tenant Organizing Committee (ETOC) of Boston DSA’s Housing Working Group. 

The expansion of Merrimack Valley DSA, which can and should be a key hub of organizing in 2026 with the rent control ballot question on the horizon, should be a priority for local members and chapter leadership.

In Cambridge

Former Harvard student organizer Ayah Al-Zubi’s campaign was also incredibly strong at identifying motivated and diligent members and turning them into loyal volunteers and leaders. The campaign utilized a number of levers, including connections to outside organizations like IfNotNow and Cambridge for Palestine, to drive volunteer turnout and mobilize over 120 unique canvassers. Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler’s campaign mobilized about half that much, facing obstacles including a clear gap in enthusiasm between an incumbent campaign and a challenger campaign, as well as, of course, the chapter’s vote to essentially deprioritize his reelection. Jivan, to his credit, more than made up for the difficulties in recruiting volunteers by knocking nearly half the campaign’s doors himself. But both campaigns were ultimately able to ride the power of the chapter’s organizing to resounding wins. 

Cambridge’s election system is peculiar. Campaigns can make it into office on much smaller-scale operations. With that in mind, we should take to heart the magnitude of our victories there and stay hungry for more.

There are certainly ways to improve our operation. For one, we should have unity in our campaigns from the jump. Factional sentiments and tensions should be smoothed over internally and resolved before launching campaigns. Cambridge DSA was fortunate to see both candidates win, but ranked endorsements like what was passed at the August general meeting muddy the chapter’s communications both internally and externally. I believe that there exists within our chapter a shared commitment to resolving internal tensions and creating a better environment for more victories going forward.  

Every Conversation, A Seed for Class Consciousness

More than anything else, the lesson we should all glean from this election cycle is that canvassing works. DSA campaigns are powered first and foremost by rank-and-file DSA members who believe in the socialist project and what our candidates stand for and represent–they, meaning you, are the front lines of our movement. Every canvass is an organizing moment that builds capacity, leadership skills, and community. And every canvass, furthermore, whether it’s for an endorsed candidate, a ballot question, or a project like Safe Communities, is an opportunity to talk about DSA. Even beyond that, every conversation plants a seed for class consciousness in the head of every worker, tenant, and future DSA member in the region. Our campaigns, even in loss, can and have made our chapter and our movement stronger. 

So to comrades in Waltham, or Quincy, or Framingham, or anywhere outside of Camberville, who don’t see a strong DSA presence on their ballots, and who see winning campaigns electoral or otherwise as too much of an uphill battle to take on, shake off your worries and take as many opportunities to organize as you can get. As long as you are there, DSA is too. 

The time to build up chapter presence in your backyard is not in a couple months or years – it is now. DSA victories are not just dominating national headlines.  They are in your area code, and you yourself  can bring them into your community.  

Ric Blair is a member of Boston DSA and contributing writer to Working Mass.

The post OPINION: Electoral Strategy With Every Canvass An Organizing Moment appeared first on Working Mass.

“}]] 

[[{“value”:”

By: Frederick Reiber

BOSTON, MA—Amid the bustle of Thanksgiving weekend–long lines, overloaded suitcases, and the familiar scramble for caffeine, Blue Bottle baristas staged their first strike. With a union-busting rap sheet almost as big as its balance sheet, workers faced down the chain’s corporate anti-union majority stakeholder during one of the company’s busiest weeks of the year.

As the holidays march towards us, workers picketed and protested to remind customers and corporate leadership that behind the churn of holiday coffee are workers whose demands can no longer be ignored.

The Blue Bottle Independent Union

In May 2024, workers across six Boston Blue Bottle locations voted to unionize, forming the Blue Bottle Independent Union (BBIU). Blue Bottle, once a small San Francisco coffee shop, has become a staple of “third-wave” specialty coffee, now boasting more than 90 locations across the United States, Japan, and Hong Kong. Nestlé purchased a majority stake in 2017, positioning the chain as a glossy, craft-focused brand operating on a tech-startup-like growth model. Nestle is notorious for egregious human rights violations, including child labor, slave labor, and preventing water access to impoverished countries and Tribal nations, among other transgressions.   

For workers, unionization was a necessary response to an ever-widening gap between corporate profits and barista wages. Nestlé reported more than $5 billion in net profit in the first half of 2025 alone, even as many employees said they struggle with living costs. Organizers also noted that this tension mirrors broader trends across the industry and city, recognizing the current ongoing Starbucks Workers United Strike and the adding of three East Bay cafés to the union in 2025.

Workers have additionally emphasized the importance of safe, non-invasive working conditions. Shortly after employees announced their union campaign, Nestlé attempted to install new surveillance cameras across stores—raising concerns about anti-union retaliation  and constant monitoring. Despite the union’s attempts to negotiate meaningful data rights, the company declared an impasse.

That provided legal cover to move forward with the installations.

A First Strike Against Blue Bottle

Recognizing the need to increase pressure at the bargaining table and build worker power, the union voted to strike during Thanksgiving week, when foot traffic surges and the company launches its Black Friday sale on coffee beans. Organizers said the goal was to escalate at a moment when a work stoppage would be impossible for management to ignore. “In the lead-up to the decision to strike, we know that Black Friday and the week around Thanksgiving is one of the times in the year where Blue Bottle makes a lot of their money,” said barista-organizer Abby Sadow. 

Union organizers emphasized that their independence played a central role in how they arrived at that decision. “One of the biggest things about being independent is that we’re able to be fully autonomous and fully democratic,” said one union leader, describing their constitution and bylaws governing strikes.

We get to set all of the dates, we get to set all of the standards… we need to make sure everybody can come to a consensus.

The process required giving baristas ample time to vote and ensuring broad agreement—reflected in the overwhelming 92 percent strike-authorization vote, demonstrating a clear collective mandate to walk out.

Workers began their strike on Wednesday, November 26, urging baristas to withhold their labor and picket outside of the shop. And despite legal challenges over where they could picket, organizers cited strong turnout across the four day strike. Reports from the union’s social media highlighted closures across the city, with only one location, Blue Bottle’s Prudential Center cafe, managing to stay open through manager scabbing. At the union’s East Bay locations, workers were also successful, shutting down all three stores during the strike.

The strike allowed BBIU to send a message in the language that shareholders in Wall Street and Davos will understand: workers are organized, and can decimate your earnings until you give them their fair share. 

Striking To Win and To Organize

Workers also described the strike not merely as a last-ditch tactic, but as a vital organizing tool in its own right. 

As current Blue Bottle Independent Union president Alex Pyne put it, the union’s understanding of strikes differs from that of some larger, more traditional labor organizations. “When we launched our union last year, we felt very strongly about doing a walkout for recognition, which I know from conversations with a lot of people that a larger union would not have allowed us to do,” the organizer said. Many unions, they noted, view strikes primarily as a final step to push a contract over the finish line, whereas their independent union sees collective refusal as the historical force that brings employers to the table in the first place. That perspective shapes the union’s approach to workplace power, allowing them to fight the boss more directly. As Pyne argued:

There’s […] an understanding that strikes are a form of protest or refusal of a regime of work in order to challenge the actual nature of the workplace and who owns it.

This approach, where strikes are used not just as a tool for bargaining but also for organizing, affected their picket line strategy. Organizers stressed the importance of getting people to talk to each other, to share and listen to the personal stories of how their company is hurting them. As one workplace leader noted:

A lot of our baristas are on government assistance with EBT and SNAP… so giving them a solution to pressure the company, I think, has been really major and really influential.

Challenges in Striking as an Independent Union

Union leaders were also candid about the challenges of being an independent union. Unlike large, multinational unions, BBIU does not have major financial reserves to rely on during work stoppages. To sustain the strike, organizers raised roughly $18,000 in community donations—enough to ensure that every striking barista received their full wages for the duration of the walkout.

That community support extended beyond funding. Organizers coordinated with the Boston DSA Labor Working Group and connected with local Starbucks Workers United partners, building broader solidarity across the coffee industry at a critical moment when multiple chains were engaged in parallel fights for better working conditions.

Even as public support grew, workers said the company continued to retaliate, reporting the firing of three union leaders in what organizers described as a clear attempt to intimidate the workforce and discourage future direct action. These egregious maneuvers are not uncommon against workers standing up to the boss, but are even less surprising when facing union-busting conglomerates like Nestle, making this worker action still more impressive.

With bargaining set to resume in January, workers say the strike has only sharpened their resolve to win a contract that reflects the realities of living in Boston. Workers are now better positioned to push for a living wage, predictable scheduling, a more transparent promotions processes, and to push back on workplace surveillance. Union estimates put the financial cost to Nestlé  at over $100,000, a strong signal that worker voice and power can not be ignored. Nestlé also has begun exploring a potential sale of the coffee chain.

For workers, though, the strike has already demonstrated their collective power. As negotiations continue, they’re ready to translate momentum into concrete, lasting gains.

Frederick Reiber is a contributing writer to Working Mass.

The post Blue Bottle Workers Shut Down Stores Across Boston in Company’s First Multi-Day Strike appeared first on Working Mass.

“}]] 

Unions must invest in new organizing if the labor movement will survive. We should consider a cautionary tale of the 1990s AFL-CIO.

The post The decline of union membership and lessons from the past appeared first on EWOC.

This article examines why outer-borough communities (home to many working-class New Yorkers who stand to gain the most) remain politically disengaged, and how NYC-YDSA can mobilize these neighborhoods to secure and sustain a true mandate for Mayor Zohran Mamdani.   Illustration by Jada Nakagawa There are many on the left who rail against the concept…

The post Handing Zohran The Mandate Of Heaven: How Can NYC-YDSA Support Mayor Mamdani Post-Election? appeared first on YDSA.

Author: Mack B.

Hey all! Verso is having an end of the year sale – if you buy five books they are all 50% off. They have a lot of great reads so I wanted to recommend five for those who are interested in the discount.

• 20% off when you buy two books
• 30% off when you buy three books
• 40% off when you buy four books
• 50% off when you buy five books

The Beast: Riding the Rails and Dodging Narcos on the Migrant Trail by Óscar Martínez is a great place to start for those who want to know more about people migrating from Central America to the US. The author follows the stories of real people making the journey to the United States and through their stories he answers common questions such as “why are people coming here?” and “why don’t they just come legally?” This is my go-to gift for the non-leftists in my life, it’s an enjoyable read that has an easy to understand message and doesn’t require slogging through boring facts and history like a typical leftist book.

Ten Myths About Israel by Ilan Pappé would be my recommendation for those looking to start reading more about Israel/Palestine. Pappé is an anti-Zionist Jewish Israeli known as one of the “New Historians” of Israel (meaning that, starting in the 80s, he wrote history that countered the standard narrative given by Israel, such as occupying an empty land, Palestinian voluntary migration, etc). In this work he goes over common myths about Israel and debunks them. These include commonly discussed topics such as the conflation of Zionism and Judaism and Zionism’s colonial history. This is a short easy read for those who want to build up a solid foundation of knowledge on Israel/Palestine.

The End of Policing by Alex S. Vitale discusses what police actually stand for (a catch-all solution to deal with the fallout of austerity politics) and how we can make real changes to better serve the community. When it comes to police reform, people I’ve talked to struggle to identify the fundamental issues with policing and, when confronted, often lob liberal reforms that don’t fix the problem. This book discusses and breaks down these issues, critiques accepted reforms and gives better solutions based on studies and practices that other counties and communities have had success with.

All-American Nativism: How the Bipartisan War on Immigrants Explains Politics as We Know It by Daniel Denvir is unfortunately more relevant than ever. This work discusses nativism on both sides of the aisle and shows that Donald Trump’s nativism is not an aberration, it is in America’s DNA. Denvir discusses the history of our immigration policies and the justifications used to deny people their right to a better life. The liberal side of the aisle has never been much better than the right on this issue and it’s important to understand that this is still happening today and a new narrative needs to be written by people on the left that sees the humanity and needs of immigrants.

Raising Expectations (and Raising Hell): My Decade Fighting for the Labor Movement by Jane McAlevey is a narrative of the author’s decade devoted to organizing a union in a hospital in the right-to-work state of Nevada. McAlevey is a must read for those interested in organizing and this book is a good place to begin. You’ll see struggles and strategies around organizing told in a narrative that is entertaining and easy to digest. The book makes you feel good and helps you understand how powerful a well organized union/organization can be.

The post Verso End of Year Sale – Book Recs! appeared first on Democratic Socialists of America.

Walter J. Nicholls is Professor of Planning and Public Policy at UC Irvine and the Faculty Director of the UC Irvine Labor Center.

“But since my aim was to write something useful for anyone interested … it would be appropriate to go to the real truth of the matter, not to repeat other people’s fantasies. Many writers have dreamed up republics and kingdoms that bear no resemblance to experience and never existed in reality;  anyone who declines to behave as people do, in order to behave as they should, is schooling himself for catastrophe…” Nicos Machiavelli, The Prince

Zohran Mamdani’s victory disrupted politics as they were and inaugurated a new moment for what politics can and should be. It was also “proof of concept” of what socialist strategy might achieve and forced the question: could Mamdani’s strategy be replicated elsewhere? Does NYC provide a roadmap to advance the socialist project nationwide?

This article reviews strategic visions that differ not in ultimate goals but in paths and timing. On one side of the spectrum are those who suggest that conditions favor replicability and a national push now in time for 2028. On the other side, there are those, like me, who suggest that NYC’s campaign is more unique than presumed. Under these circumstances, a national strategy should prioritize expanding power in the most favorable urban areas, consolidating those strongholds, and using them as platforms for expansion when conditions and opportunities allow. 

Replicating the Mamdani strategy where conditions are absent will lead to large expenditures of resources that will likely bear little to no fruit. Yet, consolidation does not mean socialism in one city. DSA can prioritize deepening its influence where: 1) favorable demographic conditions exist, 2) organizational infrastructure is established, and 3) middle-class fracturing creates openings for working-class/renter coalitions. This could mean consolidating NYC while expanding in LA or Chicago rather than less viable localities. The point is not geographic contiguity but demographic, organizational, and political strategy and readiness.

The question confronting the Left now is which strategy best fits social and political conditions as they actually exist, not as we wish them to be. The Left is particularly susceptible to this error. As partisans, our identities are animated by an optimism that human emancipation remains a material possibility. Nevertheless, the value of our prognoses depend on diagnosing social and political conditions as realistically as we can and moving ahead on such terms.

In search of national replication

 “I am a partisan. That is why I hate the ones that don’t take sides, I hate the indifferent. —Antonio Gramsci

Many on the left asserted that Mamdani’s candidate profile, message, coalition, and eventual win made clear that the time had come to take the fight for socialism to the national level. At the 2025 August Convention in Chicago, DSA activists enthused about the Mamdani surge precisely because it justified the “universal appeal” of their own foundational principles and norms. One DSA member asserted, “Campaigns like Zohran Mamdani… show that Palestine is a winning issue. That socialism is a winning issue…We can win the Democratic primary in 2028.” At the convention comrades buzzed with ideas about how to “Mamdani” their own locale. Daniel Goulden, an NYC DSA organizer, claimed “I think that the model that we used in New York is 100% replicable.” This sort of bold thinking has an important place in socialist strategy making. At the same time, precision matters.

Antonio Gramsci famously argued, “My own state of mind synthesizes these two feelings and transcends them: my mind is pessimistic, but my will is optimistic.” The challenge consists in recognizing the need to bolster the will of the optimist through statements of faith and solidarity without undercutting the realism needed to exercise the analytical realism of the pessimist’s mind. Confusing desires for what ought to be with real analysis for what is remains a major intellectual pitfall facing all socialist partisans then and now, leading to mistakes that can cost the movement resources, time, lives, and freedom.

The Mamdani Coalition

In a November 2025 Jacobin article, sociologist Vivek Chibber offers a sober assessment of barriers to building a universalizing socialist movement. He explains that neoliberalism is undergoing a profound crisis rooted in both ideological exhaustion and political decomposition. The Left’s ideological evolution magnifies this weakness. Over the last period, much of the Left has shifted toward cultural and identity-centered frameworks detached from material conditions. For Chibber, “real politics…is based on materialism, not on a vibe, not on values.” The Left must therefore reassert economic issues and universal programs rather than relying on moral language or value appeals to drive mass alignment.

Electoral victories only have value if they are a means to building the institutional and intellectual infrastructure needed to sustain the working class as a political force. Mamdani’s win represents an opening to rebuild working-class power, not a shortcut to socialist advance at the national level. A viable socialist strategy must reunite ideology with material interests, rebuild working-class institutions from the ground up, and treat electoral wins as foundations for long-term hegemonic construction. Mamdani’s win proves Chibber’s claims half right. The campaign demonstrated the potency of a campaign focused on material questions. Mamdani won by anchoring his message in tenant protections, redistribution, and public investment.

However, what made victory possible in NYC was not overwhelming support of working-class voters for Mamdani. In fact, he did not win a majority of the poorest workers, nor of homeowners. The decisive class force was in fact made up of those Chibber largely dismisses: overwhelming young renters largely attracted to his messaging on housing, intersectional multiculturalism, and the “values… and vibe” he exuded. This layer of young renters often sees itself as a mutually recognizable, coherent social unit; in fact, it contains white collar workers (teachers, nurses, proletarianized graphic designers, artists, and musicians, etc.), a much smaller layer of few blue collar workers (especially those concentrated in city unions), gig workers, independent contractors, tech professionals, entrepreneurs, low level managers, upper-middle-class urbanists, and even a few aspiring capitalists.

Paths for going national

We can all agree that electability does not require sacrificing socialist principles, as Mamdani showed in practice. However, there are different ways for understanding the when and how socialism improves or undercuts electability across different terrains. Mamdani’s victory generated a surge of momentum that many comrades interpreted as proof of a broader political opening, transforming excitement into a shared belief that the socialist moment had finally arrived. His charisma amplified this feeling: activists saw in him a leader capable of embodying a universal message and carrying it far beyond the city. 

Chibber contends that neoliberalism’s legitimacy crisis has created a rare opening across the entire political landscape, weakening ruling-class ideology and exposing deep unmet material needs. In this context, a leader who articulates clear, class-centered demands can give national shape to working-class discontent. Yet Chibber insists that socialism cannot bypass the long march through organization. National advance requires rebuilding unions, party structures, and working-class institutions capable of sustaining the fight. So what can we take away from Mamdani’s campaign?

A Gramscian case for going national begins not with momentum or charismatic leadership but with the structural demands of the regionally specific “war of position.” [Subsequent Gramsci quotes from The Modern Prince] Because the modern state is fortified through countless institutions (schools, media, courts, bureaucracies, civic networks), any local breakthrough remains precarious unless extended across wider terrains. Gramsci argues that socialism must build national reach precisely because hegemony requires transforming “common sense” at scale, forging a worldview that resonates across regions, classes, and cultural groups. National expansion is not optional escalation but strategic necessity. Yet Gramsci warns that national advance must be grounded in patient construction of a “permanently organized and long-prepared force” capable of sustaining conflict in every trench of the integral state.

Maneuver is an “expansionary” battle within the larger war of position, and any successful maneuver must be followed by consolidation. Mamdani’s campaign represents one such battle: winning the Mayor’s Office captures a single fortification within a vast state lattice of institutions, norms, and counter-powers. Bureaucracies, police, legislatures, courts, and civic infrastructures can all move to neutralize or delegitimize a socialist breakthrough, reminding us that electoral gains do not equal hegemony.

The maneuver phase unfolds through several contingent moments. First, crises inside divided elites create openings when they cannot decide whether coercion or consent will worsen their legitimacy problems. Second, insurgents can generate a surge by communicating effectively, unifying disparate groups, and expanding networks through collective effervescence. Third, the intensity of such a surge can overwhelm poorly prepared adversaries, draining their resources and legitimacy. Fourth comes the actual capture of a government institution, an achievement that remains precarious without deeper foundations.

For Gramsci, hegemonic power means that the dominant norms and values of socialism would legitimize whoever governs, just as New Deal ideology constrained Eisenhower and neoliberalism structured Clinton and Obama. After fifty years of neoliberal dominance, simply winning the White House or a city hall grants position without the legitimacy needed for durable rule. The working class and the socialist movement have clearly not accomplished this at the present time.

Consolidation is therefore critical. In Gramsci’s terms, the “integral state” contains many entrenched sites from which old forces can launch counteroffensives. Electoral victory changes one node of power while leaving most legitimating structures intact. Gramsci warned that old forces concede only to “gain time and prepare a counter-offensive.” Post-victory periods must therefore be devoted to weakening adversaries, securing hesitant allies, and binding an inter-class coalition under a working-class hegemonic vision.

Once consolidated, preparation for the next expansion must begin immediately. Socialism cannot survive in a single city because hostile forces can regroup at higher or lower scales: federal, state, or regional. Class struggle is inherently expansive; withdrawing labor or territory from capital’s circuits creates threats that provoke counter-mobilization. Believing that consolidation alone is enough risks isolation and defeat. For Gramsci, the war of position continues until one side is definitively neutralized or overthrown; there is no stable equilibrium short of that outcome.

 Local versus general political conditions

Using Gramsci’s theory of socialist strategy, Mamdani’s campaign is framed as a “war of maneuver” phase within the broader “war of position.” This analysis traces the phases of breaching state power’s outer fortifications, diminished capabilities of repair and closure, and the conditions enabling the campaign’s expansionary surge.

1.     Political Crisis Breaches Fortification: Elite Fragmentation Blocks Fast Repair Without Closure

Mamdani’s socialism, steadfast criticism of Israel, and US policy toward Palestine precipitated opposition from key elites within the Democratic Party but not all. The political crisis of the Adams administration and its ties to the Trump administration had already fractured the fortifying power of party elites. The surging popularity of the Mamdani campaign diminished the capabilities of oppositional elites to close ranks in party networks. The result was elite fragmentation and not elite closure. Support from elites came at the cost of some compromises to DSA principles. Mamdani did not disprove the “socialist principles versus electability” dilemma. Rather, contextual factors diminished the capabilities of party elites to “close ranks or tank the game.”

2.     Advantages and Disadvantages of Elite Fragmentation

Elite fragmentation weakened the capabilities of the Democratic Party to fulfill their fortifying functions but did not deactivate it. Oppositional elites had sufficient power to prolong the campaign, but not enough to close ranks and deny Mamdani support in the general election. Fragmentation proved advantageous: it enhanced insurgent legitimacy at stages of plummeting incumbent legitimacy without costing access to all resources elite gatekeepers control. Mamdani secured approximately 85 elected official endorsements, 12 labor union endorsements, and 15 organizational endorsements, while Cuomo received 7 elected officials, 6 labor unions, and 3 organizational endorsements.

3.     Preparatory Conditions: Past Consolidation Sets Stage for Surging Expansion

Past gains through maneuver had been consolidated and used as a platform to prepare and run for the next big expansion. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s 2018 congressional primary victory mobilized hundreds of volunteers and knocked on enough doors to turn out approximately 25,000 voters in a race where far fewer voters were expected. AOC’s campaign demonstrated DSA’s viability in NYC electoral politics, provided an early proof of concept for the field organizing model, and helped normalize democratic socialism as a legitimate political ideology rather than a fringe position. That win, combined with Bernie Sanders’s two presidential campaigns, catalyzed national and regional debates about socialism, which helped foster recruitment into DSA chapters across the country and region. And NYC DSA’s many years of subsequent work developed strongholds across the city. Consolidation from earlier battles elevated preparation for the next big campaign.

4.     Exceptional Expansion: Concentrated Networks as Fuel for Wildfire

Mamdani’s surge remains exceptional. Beginning at 1% in February 2025 Emerson polling when Cuomo dominated at 33%, Mamdani climbed methodically: 16% in April, 22-23% by late May, winning 56.4% to Cuomo’s 43.6% in the final ranked choice count—a 55-point swing in four months. He mobilized 26,000-30,000 volunteers during the primary who knocked on over 644,000 doors, expanding to 76,000 volunteers by the general election with over 500,000 doors knocked and 1 million phone calls. Networks attracted greater resources, labor, monetary contributions, and in-kind support for increasingly sophisticated citywide infrastructure.

5.     Messaging: Centering Economic Issues, Sticking Close to Socialist Values

Mamdani’s disciplined messaging on material affordability (rent freezes, free buses, universal childcare) combined with progressive differentiator issues (Gaza, LGBTQ+ protections) helped broaden resonance while solidifying the loyalty of his core base. The message was also refined through constant testing of various iterations in base building politics, deftly exploiting Cuomo’s vulnerabilities from sexual harassment and nursing home scandals to position himself as the honest alternative against a discredited past.

Yet, even accounting for all this, Mamdani secured a thin majority (50.4%), approximately 17 percentage points less than Kamala Harris’s NYC performance in the 2024 presidential election (67.70%). He did not win a majority of votes in Queens, despite large investments of time spent canvassing and money spent on advertising. Mamdani won a plurality in the borough and does not appear to have converted many Trump voters. This was not a blowout or an overwhelming mandate.

Politically, Mamdani’s victory emerged from an exceptional convergence: fractured Democratic Party elites, a delegitimized incumbent administration, and activist networks capable of exploiting the breach. These conditions sharply reduced the Democratic party’s ability to coordinate a unified counteroffensive. Yet such fragmentation is far from national. In most states, party machines remain cohesive, institutional fortifications stronger, and local elites more capable of closing ranks. Without comparable organizational density elsewhere, a national offensive would confront far more fortified political terrain.

Breaking down Mamdani’s votes

Mamdani’s winning coalition reflects trends powering other DSA candidates into city council seats across the country, even if he is the first DSA member to win a mayoral race in a major city. The electoral coalition consisted of:

1.     The Youth Vote: Powerful but Not Dominant

Approximately 75-78% of voters aged 18-29 supported Mamdani, compared to 19% for Cuomo and 5% for Sliwa. Young women aged 18-29 were more unified at 84%, while young men gave 68% support—a 42-point margin over Cuomo among young men who had shifted significantly rightward nationally. Youth turnout was strong at approximately 28%, nearly double the 14% in the previous mayoral cycle. The key was not that young voters became dominant but that they turned out at higher rates and voted with near-unanimous support.

2.     Recent Arrivals: The Most Overrepresented Group

Among voters in NYC five years or less, 85% supported Mamdani—his most unified demographic group. Recent arrivals constituted 15-20% of his coalition while representing only 8-10% of NYC’s voting population. Mamdani’s coalition was young, mobile, renters. His message about rent freezes, universal childcare, and free buses resonated with direct economic self-interest.

3.     Middle to Upper Middle-Class Coalition

Mamdani won the majority of voters earning $30,000-$299,999 annually. Those below $30,000 and above $300,000 favored Cuomo—a salient inversion for a democratic socialist. His strongest performance was among voters earning $100,000-$200,000, where he won 55% to Cuomo’s 37%. His coalition consisted of people with financial stability to care about cultural and affordability issues but not so wealthy as to be insulated from housing cost concerns.

4.     The Multiracial Coalition

Mamdani won approximately 60% of white voters, 52% of Black voters, and 60% of Latino voters. White people make up only 31.3% of NYC’s population but roughly 40-45% of Mamdani’s voters. This reflects the concentration of recent arrivals, college-educated professionals, and gentrifying neighborhoods (heavily white) in his coalition. Mamdani also significantly overperformed among young Black voters (83% according to CIRCLE data) and in heavily Black neighborhoods like Bed-Stuy in Brooklyn. Latino voters showed mixed support at 60%, which was 7% less than Kamala Harris’s 67% of the vote. Given Latinos’ share of NYC’s population (28.4%), this suggests that Latino voters split more evenly with Cuomo than other demographic groups. This split likely reflected class divisions and regional variation; working-class immigrant communities in some areas of Queens and the Bronx proved more responsive to Cuomo’s message. Mamdani won 49% of Asian Americans but 70%+ among young Asian voters. Approximately 90% of Muslim voters supported Mamdani, making this by far his most unified demographic group. He won only 31-33% of Jewish voters, creating a 29-point deficit compared to Cuomo.

5.     LGBTQ+ and Gender Dynamics

82% of the 14% of voters identifying as LGBTQ+ supported Mamdani, translating to 10-12% of his coalition despite LGBTQ+ voters representing only 5-7% of NYC’s population. Young women aged 18-29 voted for Mamdani at 84%, compared to young men at 68%—a 16-point gap particularly striking given young men’s national rightward shift.

6.     Partisan Alignment

Mamdani won 66% of Democratic voters compared to Cuomo’s 31%, demonstrating remarkable partisan cohesion. Among Independents, the race was tighter: Mamdani won 43% compared to Cuomo’s 34% and Sliwa’s 18%—a potential vulnerability in his coalition.

Socially, the coalition relied on demographics distinctive to large urban centers with high “culture industry” concentrations: recent arrivals, highly mobile renters, young multiracial professionals, LGBTQ communities, and culturally progressive middle and upper-middle class segments. These groups are overrepresented in New York but sparse across small cities, suburbs, and rural regions. Nationally, the working class is older, more rooted in place, more likely homeowners, more religious, and more culturally conservative. The social base powering Mamdani’s campaign is geographically concentrated, making national replication difficult without first reshaping broader conditions.

Urban conjuncture and the new socialism

A distinct urban conjuncture has emerged in a handful of U.S. cities, producing conditions far more favorable to socialist advance than those found nationally. These cities combine soaring housing costs, generational displacement, fractured middle-class interests, and dense networks of activists, tenants, and young professionals. It is within this alignment that Minneapolis, New York City, Los Angeles, and similar metros have become laboratories for new socialist politics.

For decades, American cities operated under a stable class coalition: developers received profitable construction areas while white middle-class homeowners secured low-density neighborhoods with appreciating property values. As housing became unaffordable, a younger generation—including both workers and middle-class professionals—found themselves priced out of homeownership. Housing became the central issue introducing intra-middle-class conflict within a class demonstrating remarkable unity since the 1980s. This generational conflict precipitated splitting of the urban middle class into three factions: NIMBY (dominant older fraction), YIMBY (market-oriented professionals), and DSA (abandoning homeownership aspirations, aligning with the working class for non-market solutions).

These divisions characterize New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Minneapolis and other expensive cities where the young middle class cannot afford entry into the housing market. Mamdani’s coalition in NYC mirrors this pattern: his strongest support came from young renting professionals and workers who had defected from traditional middle-class politics. And this is not the first time we have seen this pattern: between 2010 and 2021, Minneapolis’s City Council shifted from three progressives to eight, driven by gentrifying neighborhoods with concentrated university-educated millennials. Similar dynamics are reshaping NYC electoral politics. 

However, Minneapolis reveals a crucial limitation: despite sweeping political victories and near-unanimous City Council support for upzoning legislation, the old homeowning middle class used its structural resources to block implementation through planning offices, county jurisdiction, courts, and the state legislature. Technical policy solutions, even progressive ones, cannot overcome fundamentally political problems rooted in lack of hegemony. Winning elections does not automatically translate to policy implementation when economic elites maintain veto points throughout governmental and civil society institutions.

The pattern is replicating in NYC. Mamdani won through coalition with young renters and recent arrivals, yet the old neoliberal coalition still controls courts, real estate boards, and bureaucratic institutions. His ability to govern will depend on constructing sufficient hegemonic power to overcome structural veto points.

So what is to be done? Mamdani’s victory was inspiring and points to a better future for socialists. Using Gramsci as a guide, the answer should be clear: we must fight a war of position, not maneuver. Why?

First, this was a very narrow victory with almost no margin for error at the national level.

The narrowness (50.4%) meant minimal margin for error. Loss of just 1%, approximately 10,000 votes, would have resulted in plurality victory with ranked-choice complications. Alienating even smallest fractions of constituent groups would have cost the majority—far more difficult to replicate in northern Wisconsin than Brooklyn.

Second, potential fickleness in the coalition.

Vulnerabilities were distributed unevenly. Loss of 15-20% of young voter support would have cost 25,000-30,000 votes. The greatest vulnerability appears in working-class support, which Mamdani split with Cuomo rather than dominating. A shift of 10% of working-class voters could have changed the outcome.

Third, the local trap and why the coalition cannot scale nationally.

The relative youth of his coalition (20-22% under 35 compared to 15-18% nationally), higher proportion of renters (67% in NYC versus 35% nationally), college-educated concentration, and high proportion of recent arrivals suggest demographic foundations specific to cities like NYC. A candidate replicating this strategy in suburban or rural areas would face different terrain. Homeowners (70% nationally versus 30% in NYC) would be significantly less likely to support rent control and wealth-taxation policies.

Fourth, he needs to improve margins with Black, Latino, and working-class voters.

He won a majority of the Black vote but not margins as large as past Democratic candidates. More concerning: Latino vote at lower margins than Harris in 2024, with Latino support for Democratic candidates dropping nearly 10% every election cycle.

Fifth, uncertainty regarding the left message.

Strident left positions drive high turnout in large global cities, especially among young gentrifiers, but may repel centrist blocs in suburbs and rural areas. Strong commitment to his critical position on Israel cost a large share of Jewish votes. His strong embrace of socialism resonated with youth but lost homeowners, many ideologically conservative Latinos and immigrants. In NYC, this trade-off worked because renters comprise nearly 50% of the city. Nationally, the split is 70:30 favoring homeowners. These positions admired in NYC may repel certain voting blocs while offering only limited reservoirs from which to extract new voters.

Conclusion: consolidate political territory, not just geographic territory

The fight for hegemony is a war, not a single battle. Electoral victory constitutes one engagement in a protracted struggle.

1. The goal of all parties is to achieve a socialist hegemonic project nationally; the point of debate is which strategy is best suited for achieving this end goal. This analysis suggests a strategy of scaling up to the national level through consolidating regional hegemony and using consolidated regions as leveraging platforms to propel expansion to the next opportune battle.

Mamdani’s coalition depends on specific structural conditions: high concentrations of young renters, recent arrivals, gentrifying neighborhoods, and university-educated populations facing permanent exclusion from homeownership. DSA should prioritize deepening its foothold in cities and regions where: 1) these demographic conditions already exist, 2) DSA has established organizational infrastructure, and 3) the fracturing of the middle class has created openings for working-class/renter coalitions. This could mean consolidating in NYC while contributing to expanding power in LA or Chicago, rather than upstate NY, if the political terrain is more favorable. The point is not geographic contiguity but demographic and organizational readiness.

2. Once a battle is won, consolidation of position becomes imperative through three simultaneous processes: securing the consent of civil society institutions, bolstering domination throughout the state apparatus, and neutralizing political enemies by extracting them from the structural conditions that enabled their power.

Enemies of socialist forces never truly disappear; they retreat into the shadows, awaiting opportunities for counter-offensive. 

Building our first instances of regional influence therefore requires simultaneous forward and backward movement: looking forward to construct intellectual and political leadership across an expanding and increasingly indomitable coalition, while looking backward to extract reactionary enemies waiting in the shadows, sabotaging and scheming for restoration.

In New York City, this challenge is complicated because political enemies come in multiple guises and display little consistent loyalty. This ambiguity blurs the line between friend and enemy when clarity is most needed. Mamdani’s dependence on a substantial Democratic base complicates efforts to target enemies within the party apparatus itself. However, he currently enjoys extraordinary levels of public support, which makes Democratic elites less inclined toward outright sabotage and more inclined toward a cynical strategy of appropriating his charisma and momentum for their own purposes. Recognizing this temporary advantage, Mamdani must move with strategic urgency to establish Democratic dependence on him for their political futures rather than the reverse.

3. Mamdani’s symbolic power is at its peak now and will wane. Maximal consolidation sooner will avoid closure and restoration later.

This moment provides his greatest leverage to consolidate asymmetric power relations over potential rivals within the Democratic apparatus, establishing himself as indispensable rather than replaceable to their political futures and livelihoods. With other enemies (reactionary business interests, the police bureaucracy, the real estate establishment) different tactics apply. These are the fickle constituencies least bound by party loyalty or ideological coherence. They respond to power and the credible threat of counter-power, not to appeals to shared governance or compromise. The tempo of consolidation matters enormously. Delay allows enemies to regroup, rebuild coalitions, and mobilize their substantial structural resources. The question facing Mamdani in his first months in office is whether he recognizes that electoral victory opened a war, not concluded one, and whether he possesses the strategic clarity and ruthlessness necessary to consolidate his position before the inevitable counter-offensive begins.

4. Hegemony must guide tactical choices over consolidation and expansions: Until a political bloc emerges capable of bridging these divides and constructing the intellectual and moral leadership necessary for genuine cross-class hegemony, urban governance will remain volatile and ineffective.

What is needed is not merely electoral victory but a transformative political project that unites diverse constituencies around a shared vision of the city as a common good and reorganizes civil society according to socialist principles. For DSA chapters, this means the painstaking work of organizing across class and racial divides to create hegemonic blocs capable of challenging the commodification of housing at its root, not merely winning individual campaigns but systematically constructing “the permanent organization of the intellectual strata” necessary to build durable, transformative political power. The Minneapolis experience demonstrates that without such systematic hegemonic construction, even left-wing electoral victories will be neutralized by the counteroffensive of established economic interests defending their structural position.

Workers with Ziff Davis Creators Guild won pro-worker language in their latest collective bargaining agreement. Here's how and what they won.

The post How we won AI protections in our contract appeared first on EWOC.

(October 2025)

Across Ecuador, Indigenous, peasant, and working-class communities have risen once again to defend life, dignity, and sovereignty in the face of a government that governs for capital, not the people. The Noboa government has answered peaceful resistance with systematic state terror—deploying thousands of troops to occupy Indigenous territories, firing live rounds and tear gas indiscriminately at protesters and residents alike, and criminalizing the very act of defending one’s community. The Democratic Socialists of America’s International Committee extends our unconditional solidarity to the families of those killed and wounded, to the hundreds detained, and to the peoples of Imbabura, Cotacachi, Otavalo, and every territory now under siege.

1. We join their demands

We endorse the demands articulated by CONAIE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador), UNORCAC (Union of Indigenous Peasant Organizations of Cotacachi), FICI (Federación Indígena y Campesina de Imbabura), and allied popular organizations:

• Immediate repeal of Executive Decree 126, which raised diesel prices more than 50% overnight and deepened poverty across Ecuador.
  
• An end to militarization, emergency decrees, and curfews imposed under the false pretext of “public order.”
  
• Neutral, civilian-led humanitarian corridors, coordinated with the Red Cross and human-rights monitors — not military convoys disguised as relief.
  
• Freedom for all detainees, the dropping of “terrorism” and related charges, and full reparations to the victims and families of state violence.
  
• Independent, international investigations into killings, disappearances, and the criminal use of live ammunition against demonstrators.
  
• Guarantees of non-repetition: training, command accountability, and civilian oversight of the Armed Forces and National Police.
  
• Protection of Indigenous and community media, including Radio Ilumán, TV MICC, and Apak TV, whose journalists have been attacked or censored.
  

2. We reject the authoritarian referendum

President Noboa’s referendum is not a democratic exercise but a tool to consolidate executive power, criminalize protest, and entrench the neoliberal model that produced this crisis.

In solidarity with CONAIE and Ecuador’s social movements, we support the campaign for a nationwide “No” vote and affirm that true democracy lives in the assemblies, cabildos, and territories of the organized people—not in plebiscites designed to legitimize repression.

3. We affirm an internationalist duty

We call on the U.S. government to end all forms of military and police cooperation that enable repression in Ecuador.

We urge labor unions, Indigenous federations, and left organizations worldwide to send observers, condemn the violence, and amplify the media of the Ecuadorian movement.
We encourage DSA chapters and members to:

1. Circulate this statement through your chapter’s mailing lists, internal communications, and social media channels to raise awareness about the crisis in Ecuador.
2. Contribute to neutral humanitarian funds identified by CONAIE and UNORCAC.
3. Pressure their elected officials to demand an end to militarization and to support international investigations.

As we stand with the First Nations here, we stand with the Indigenous peoples of Ecuador — one struggle for life and sovereignty.

In Conclusion

Ecuador’s uprising reminds us that austerity and authoritarianism are two faces of the same project. The struggle against neoliberalism in Ecuador is inseparable from our fight in the United States for public goods, workers’ rights, and socialism.

From Quito to Chicago, from Cotacachi to New York, our struggle is one.

¡Ni un paso atrás! We stand with the peoples of Ecuador in defense of life, territory, and dignity.

DSA Declaración de solidaridad con el pueblo de Ecuador

(octubre de 2025)

En todo el Ecuador, las comunidades indígenas, campesinas y la clase trabajadora se han levantado una vez más para defender la vida, la dignidad y la soberanía frente a un gobierno que prioriza al capital, no al pueblo. El gobierno de Noboa ha respondido a la resistencia pacífica con un terror estatal sistemático, desplegando miles de soldados para ocupar territorios indígenas, disparando balas reales y gases lacrimógenos indiscriminadamente contra manifestantes y residentes por igual, y criminalizando la defensa de sus comunidades.

El Comité Internacional de los Socialistas Democráticos de América extiende su solidaridad incondicional a las familias de los fallecidos y heridos, a los cientos de detenidos y a los pueblos de Imbabura, Cotacachi, Otavalo y todos los territorios que ahora se encuentran sitiados.

1. Nos sumamos a sus reivindicaciones

Respaldamos las reivindicaciones articuladas por la CONAIE (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador), la UNORCAC (Unión de Organizaciones Campesinas Indígenas de Cotacachi) y las organizaciones populares aliadas:

• Derogación inmediata del Decreto Ejecutivo 126, que aumentó los precios del diésel más de un 50 % de la noche a la mañana y agravó la pobreza en todo Ecuador.
• El fin de la militarización, los decretos de emergencia y los toques de queda impuestos bajo el falso pretexto del «orden público».
• Corredores humanitarios neutrales y dirigidos por civiles, coordinados con la Cruz Roja y observadores de derechos humanos, en lugar de convoyes militares disfrazados de ayuda humanitaria.
• Libertad para todos los detenidos, retirada de los cargos de «terrorismo» y otros relacionados, y plena reparación para las víctimas y las familias de la violencia estatal.
• Investigaciones internacionales independientes sobre los asesinatos, las desapariciones y el uso criminal de munición real contra los manifestantes.
• Garantías de no repetición: formación, responsabilidad del mando y supervisión civil de las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional.
• Protección de los medios de comunicación indígenas y comunitarios, incluidos Radio Ilumán, TV MICC y Apak TV, cuyos periodistas han sido atacados o censurados.

2. Rechazamos el referéndum autoritario

El referéndum del presidente Noboa no es un ejercicio democrático, sino una herramienta para consolidar el poder ejecutivo, criminalizar la protesta y afianzar el modelo neoliberal que ha provocado esta crisis.

En solidaridad con la CONAIE y los movimientos sociales de Ecuador, apoyamos la campaña por el «No» a nivel nacional y afirmamos que la verdadera democracia vive en las asambleas, los cabildos y los territorios del pueblo organizado, y no en plebiscitos diseñados para legitimar la represión.

3. Afirmamos un deber internacionalista

Hacemos un llamamiento al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos para que ponga fin a todas las formas de cooperación militar y policial que permiten la represión en Ecuador.

Instamos a los sindicatos, las federaciones indígenas y las organizaciones de izquierda de todo el mundo a que envíen observadores, condenen la violencia y amplifiquen los medios de comunicación del movimiento ecuatoriano.

Animamos a las secciones y miembros de la DSA a que:

1. Difundan esta declaración a través de las listas de correo, las comunicaciones internas y los canales de redes sociales de su sección para crear conciencia sobre la crisis en Ecuador.
2. Contribuyan a los fondos humanitarios neutrales identificados por la CONAIE y la UNORCAC.
3. Presionen a sus funcionarios electos para que exijan el fin de la militarización y apoyen las investigaciones internacionales.

Así como apoyamos a las Primeras Naciones aquí, apoyamos a los pueblos indígenas del Ecuador: una sola lucha por la vida y la soberanía.

En conclusión

El levantamiento de Ecuador nos recuerda que la austeridad y el autoritarismo son dos caras del mismo proyecto. La lucha contra el neoliberalismo en Ecuador es inseparable de nuestra lucha en Estados Unidos por servicios y bienes públicos, los derechos de los trabajadores y la democracia descolonizada.

De Quito a Chicago, de Cotacachi a Nueva York, nuestra lucha es una sola.

¡Ni un paso atrás! Nos solidarizamos con los pueblos de Ecuador en defensa de la vida, el territorio y la dignidad.

The post DSA Statement of Solidarity with the People of Ecuador appeared first on DSA International Committee.